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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PERRY MESSICK,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
-v-

PHD TRUCKING SERVICE,

INC.,

Supreme Court No. 16605

De fendan t-Responden t.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to compel the lessee to account for
payments due to lessor under a truck leasing agreement and for
judgment for the amount owing the lessor.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried on April 19, 1979, before Judge
Sorensen in the District Court of Utah County.

The Court

found that the parties had reached an accord and satisfaction on October 22, 1976, and entered judgment for the
defendant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-appellant prays that this Court reverse the
findings of the trial court and award judgment for the
plaintiff in accordance with his proposed findings of fact.
In the alternative,

it is prayed that this Court will find

that the rlisputed lease agreements are valid and enforceable
again st the rle fend ant and remand the case for a new trial on

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff,
Kenworth truck.
1973, from Verl

Perry Messick, was the owner of a 1963

He had bought this truck on December 7,
Davies and Ray Hiatt for $10,000.

He paid

$2,000 down and gave a note for the balance to Davies and
Hiatt.

Davies and Hiatt are the owners and principal officers

of PHO Trucking.

( R. 89,

183).

On January 1, 1974, the plaintiff entered into a lease
agreement with the defendant, PHO Trucking.

(R.95, 124)

The

terms of the lease were that PHO would pay to the plaintiff
$. 32 per mile for

the use of the truck and $.10 per mile for

the driver of the truck.

(R.115, Ex.

3,4).

Over the next two years and three months, plaintiff's
truck was driven on hauling assignments for the defendant.
It was plaintiff's belief that the terms of the lease were
(R.124).

in effect throughout this period.

The lease expired

on July 1, 1974, and the parties signed another identical
agreement on November 22, 1974.

( R. 12 6) •

In this four and

one-half month interval, the defendant continued to use the
plaintiff's truck and the parties understood that the terms
of the lease governed their relationship.

( R. 206-207).

It was arranged between the parties that payments which
became due to the plaintiff would be retained by the defendant
ano credited tow a rd the amount that he owed to Mr. Davies
and Mr. Hiatt on the truck.

(R.93,

100).
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In January of 1975, the plaintiff began inquiries as to
how much he still owed on the truck.
that it was almost paid for.

Mr. Davies told him

( R.126).

In May of 1975,

thinking that his truck had been paid off, the plaintiff
ceased hauling for the defendant and leased his truck out to
other companies.
t~

(R.126).

Throughout this period and into

Fall of 1976, the plaintiff made numerous requests that

the defendant account to him for the monies it had retained.
(R.126, 128).

The plaintiff received no accounting for the

amount owing him under the lease.
~wever,

true k.

In early October, 1976,

he was informed that he still owed $9,800.00 on the
(R.130).

Approximately one week later, the plaintiff

offered to sell his truck back to Davies and Hiatt.
~tober

On

22, 1976, the plaintiff re-conveyed all of his

interest in the truck for $1,586.03.

( R. 13 0 Ex • 7 ) •

The plaintiff refused to accept the figures given to
him concerning ton haulage payments and this lawsuit ensued.
M trial,

the defendant's employees, Mr.

Davies and Mr.

Hiatt, testified that they never intended to pay plaintiff
~der

the terms of the lease.

(R.115-116,

169).

They claimed

that the parties had agreed that payment would be made on a
'tonnage rate per trip' basis, and that the lease agreement
was executed only to convince

the Public Service Commission

that the plain ti ff was operating under defendant's Certificate
of Convenience.
1 ·1er

(R.95-96,

186).

This testimony was admitted

plaintiff's objection that it was parol evidence
·1·1

ill•]

ln vary lhe terms of a writing.

(R.205).

The
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defendant's accounting to the plaintiff used the tonnage per
trip rate rather than the rate spelled out in the lease
agreement.

(Ex.

5 & 6).

As a result of this, a much lower

sum of money was credited to the plaintiff's account and the
defendant's books showed that the truck had run a deficit.
(R.101).

The plaintiff is now seeking the difference between

what he was actually paid and the amount that he should have
been paid pursuant to the lease.

The calculation of this

amount is shown in Exhibit 30.
The Court entered judgment for the defendant on the
ground that the parties had reached an accord and satisfaction
on October 22, 1976, by the reconveyance of the plaintiff's
truck to Mr.

Davies and Mr. Hiatt.

The plaintiff's motion

for a new trial was denied and this appeal ensued.
ARGUMENT
POI!JT I
THE WRITTEN LEASE AGREEMENT CANNOT BE MODIFIED BY PAROL
EVIDENCE.
The defendant drafted the leases in question (Exhibits
and 4) and persuaded the plaintiff to execute them by
telling him that he could not lawfully drive for them
without such a lease agreement.

At trial, over plaintiff's

objection (R.205), defendant introduced testimony that it
did not intend to be bound by the terms of the lease which
required it to pay plaintiff thirty-two cents ( $. 32) per
mile for the truck and ten cents ( $ .10) per mile for the
driver.
,, Ji

( R. 11 S-116,

169).

Such testimony is inadmissible as

''vidence citt;'mpting to vary the plain, unambiguous
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the parties·

The Oregon Supreme Court announced this rule

in Kergil v. Central Oregon Fir Supply Company, 323 P. 2d 947
(Or., 1958), a case identical to the present action.
In Kergil, a truck owner executed a written agreement
leasing his truck to the defendant for the purpose of hauling
lumber.

The defendant paid the plaintiff some money but it

was less than the amount stated in the lease.
At trial the defendant admitted the execution of the
lease but said that it was a pretend agreement entered only
so that it could be filed with the Public Service Commission
to receive a favorable tax treatment.

The defendant said

that the true agreement was that plaintiff would be paid a
fixed amount per thousand board feet hauled.
The Court held that such testimony was inadmissable parol
evidence attempting to vary the terms of a writing.

It said:

Thus, the principal question is: Will the
law permit consideration of oral evidence
denying the validity of the written memorial
of the parties when such oral evidence shows
the written document was executed for the
purpose of defrauding or misleading a third
party?
The courts are not of a single mind upon
this issue.
We confess, the majority of
jurisdictions at the present time, based
upon pure logic, admit the evidence on the
basis that such testimony is offered, not
to vary the terms of the written instrument
within the letter of the parole evidence
rule, but only to show the parties never
intended the written instrument to be a
binding agreement.
The difficulty with this view is that it
overlooks the moral aspects of the situation.
It permits the law to be used to lend its
aid to those who would mislead or defraud
third parties without providing any restraining penalty upon their immoral actions.
Of
tiH' JT:ajcnitv view, the eminent Michigan law
[>n>f•·c;sor ,John E. Tracy, 33 Michigan Law Review
411 by the
(1934-34),
speaks
thus:provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Sponsored
S.J. Quinney Law Library.
Funding for digitization
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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'A rule admitting such testimony
encourages dishonest men in pursuing
fraudulent practices.
If such a man
knows that he can, to his profit, with
little risk to himself, deceive his
neighbor by arranging to have exhibited
to such neighbor a contract apparently
binding but legally unenforceable, can
it not be expected that he will do so?
Also would it not be equally apparent
to the layman that a dishonest man,
faced with certain liability on a contract which he has signed, under such
a rule could always create for himself
a chance of avoiding such liability by
inventing testimony to show that he
signed the contract only for the purpose of deceiving someone not a party
to the cause? For, under the rule as
laid down by the authorities, against
such testimony, if believed by the jury,
the court is powerless to do justice,
however preposterous the court may feel
it to be.'
And Professor Wigmore, 9 Wigmore on
Evidence 16, §2406, states the following:
'When the document is to serve the
purpose of a mere sham, this principle
in strictness exonerates the makers.
But a just policy would seem to concede
this only when the pretense is a morally
justifiable one (as, to calm a lunatic
or to console a dying person). When it
is morally beyond sanction, or aims at an
evasion of the law or a deception of other
persons, by intention of the parties, that
intention will not be given effect.
Hence
if the validity of the instrument would
give effect to such intention (as in usury),
the instrument will not be enforced; but
if the invalidity of the instrument would
give effect to such intention, the instrument will be enforced.'
Other courts have adopted this
rule which we believe is the one most
in conformity with the dictates of
justice.
See Graham v. Savage, 110
Minn. 510, 126 N.W. 394; Higby v.
floorer:_, 124 Mont. 331, 221 P.2d 1043;
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Supreme Lodge Knights of Phythias v.
Dalzell, 205 Mo.App. 207, 223 S.W. 786;
Gagnon v. Fleury, 117 Vt. 382, 92 A.2d
470; Town of Grand Isle v. Kinney, 70
Vt. 381, 41 A.130.
See dissent in Hoss
v. Purinton, 9 Cir., 229 F.2d 104. ~~
Under the facts in this case, the
trial court erred in admitting testimoney of another and different oral contract from that expressed by the parties
in their executed written leases.
Other cases in support of this rule are Bersani v.
~neral

Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corporation, 36

N. y. 2d 4 5 7 I

3 6 9 N• y. s • 2d 1 0 8 I

Schnabel v.

Vaughn, 140 N.W.2d 168 (Ia. 1966); Meyer v.

3 3 0 N. E • 2d 6 8 ( N • y. 1 9 7 5 ) ;

Weber, 109 S.W.2d 702 (Mo.1937).
The defendant should not be allowed to escape liability
on contracts that it drafts by claiming that the true purpose
of the contract was to defraud a government agency.

Such a

result would encourage the defendant to continue its illegal
Indeed, the defendant has indicated that such

conduct.

conduct is already its standard operating procedure.

(R.186).

i'lithout the parol evidence of the defendent accepted by the
court, the proof offered by the plaintiff would have been
unclisputed and irrefutable.
POINT I I
THE LEASE AGREEMENT CANNOT BE ALTERED
BY THE DEFENDANT'S SUBJECTIVE INTENTIONS.
While the intent of the parties to a contract is determinative of its meaning, it is fundamental that only objective
:,anifestations of intent will effect the interpretation.
unsp"ken or subiective
11

''

1

un

tlw1r aqrf"ement.

intents of the parties have no
This is stated in 17 Am.Jur.2d,

by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Jtittcicts Sponsored
§245:
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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It is not necessarily the real
intent, but the expressed or apparent intent, which is sought.
The
court will not attempt to ascertain
the actual mental processes of the
parties in entering into the particular contract; rather the law presumes that the parties understood
the import of their contract and that
they had the intention which its
terms manifest.
In Clyde v. Eddington Canning Company, 10 Utah 2d 14,
347 P.2d 563

(1959), the defendant had signed an instrument

in which he personally guaranteed payment for goods his
corporation bought from the plaintiff.

The defendant later

sought to avoid personal liability by claiming that it was
not his intention to be bound in his personal capacity.
This court sustained a summary judgment for the plaintiff
stating that "under the clear language of the writing we are
not impressed with such contention, particularly since
intentions cannot vary the terms of clear, concise, unambiguous language employed by him who says he did not intend
what he said."
The objective manifestations made to plaintiff were
that the plaintiff would receive thirty-two cents ($.32) per
mile for the lease of his truck and ten cents ($.10) per
mile for its driver.

They were made when the defendant's

employees approached plaintiff, told him that he needed a
lease agreement to legally work for them and presented to
him an il<Jreement which they had prepared and which stated
tl,at

h0 woulcl receive the said amounts.
,1-10;

,~xc>cutc>cl,

Mr.

At the time the

Davies and Mr. Hiatt did not tell

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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plaintiff that they intended the lease to be a sham.

Mr. Hiatt

stated that he relied on previous discussions with plaintiff
to make their intention clear (R.168, line 3, page 170, line
18).

It was certainly reasonable for the plaintiff to

understand that the lease presented to him was meant to be
valid and not an attempt to circumvent the law.

It was the

defendant's burden to make such an intention absolutely
clear and in failing to do so it must be bound by the words
it wrote as they would be reasonably understood.
POINT III
THE CREATOR OF AN ILLEGAL CONTRACT SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED
TO ENFORCE IT OR TO PROFIT FROM ITS TERMS.

The defendant asserts that the true contract between
the parties was a tonnage per trip rate of payment.

Such a

contract is illegal because plaintiff cannot operate under
defendant's Certificate of Convenience under any method of
payment except leasing.

Thus if defendant argues that the

leases are a sham he is also arguing that the "true" contract
is illegal.
Generally, the court will extend no relief to the
parties of an illegal contract, however, when the parties
are not in pari delicto the courts will give relief to the
innocent or less guilty party by either enforcing the contract
or by giving the value of any services rendered.

The law is

stated in "Contracts," 17 Am.Jur.2d §227, 607:
Where the one party is the principal
offender and the other criminal only
from a constrained acquiescence in the
illegal conduct, in such cases there is
no parity of delictum at all between
the parties, and the one protected by
law or
compulsion
may,
at of Museum and Library Services
Sponsored
by the acting
S.J. Quinney Lawunder
Library. Funding
for digitization provided
by the Institute
Services and
administered
by the Utah State Library.
any time, Library
resort
toTechnology
the Act,
law
to recover.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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The case law in Utah and other states is in accord.
In Gorringe vs.

Read, 23 Utah 120, 63 P. 902 (1901) this

court stated:
It is no doubt true, as a general
proposition that a court of equity . . •
will not interpose to aid parties who
are concerned in unlawful transactions
or agreements; but where public policy
requires relief to be given, and when
the parties, though in delicto, are
not in pari delicto, - as when, at the
time-Of the transaction, the complainant was under undue influence, hardship, or oppression, or great inequality of condition or age existed,
and acted involuntarily, - the maximum
does not apply.
The reason is that in
such cases the public interests and
justice require relief to be given,
even though the complaint be by one
who is particeps criminis.
The Oregon Supreme Court rendered a similar holding in
Oregon

&

Western Colonization Company v. Johnson, 102 P. 2d

928 (Oregon 1940).

It said:

Where the parties to an illegal
bargain though both blameworthy, are
not in pari delicto, and one of them
has not been guilty of serious moral
turpitude, he can repudiate the bargain and if he has rendered any performance thereunder recover it or its
value.
Finally, in Redke v. Silver Trust, 98 Cal.Rptr.293, 490

P.2d 805 (1971), the California Supreme Court stated that:
A bargain may be illegal by
reason of the wrongful purpose
of one or both of the parties making
it.
This is true even though the
performances bargained for are not
in themselves illegal and even though
-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in the absence of the illegal purpose the bargain would be valid and
enforceable.
The party that makes
such a bargain in furtherance of his
wrongful purpose cannot enforce it,
even though it is enforceable against
him by the other party if the latter
is innocent of such a purpose. (Emphasis
in original).
The plaintiff is not in pari delicto in regards to the
illegal tonnage contract.

He understood that he was operating

legally under valid leases, (R.124).
was paying him under an

He was unaware that PHD

illegal contract.

( R.125, 131).

The

defendant should be estopped from asserting such an illegal
contract and should be required to pay the plaintiff the amount
manifested in the leases, such sum being the reasonable value
of plaintiffs services.
Even if the parties were in pari delicto, public policy
dictates that the defendant should be required to live up to
rates promised in the leases.

Otherwise the defendant will

profit from his illegal scheme and will have incentive to
In Local Federal Savings and Loan Association v.

repeat it.

Sheets, 130 P. 2d 825 (Okla.

1942) the Court said that "when

public policy demands the granting of relief, the same will
be afforded regardless of the illegality of the transaction
1·1ith which it is connected."
POINT IV
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS OR THE LAW.
A.

Standard of Review.

occountinq in equity.
1.

~11

I

111

This is an action for an

The nature of an equitable accounting

/\c1·oLmts and Accounting, 1 Am.Jur.2d §52, page

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Courts of equity have jurisdiction
to state and settle accounts, or to compel
an accounting, where a fiduciary relationship exists between the parties and duty
rests upon the defendant to render an
account.
This right exists not only in
the case where those relationships which
are traditionally regarded as those of
trust and confidence, but also in those
informal relations which exist whenever
one person trusts in and relies upon another.
The relationship between an employer and employee, between parties to
a business agreement, and between an
officer of a school board and school
district, have all been held to involve
such confidence and trust as to
entitle one of the parties to an
accounting in equity. (Emphasis added).
The plaintiff had entrusted the defendant with much of
the money that his truck had earned so that it could be
~plied

to the debt that he owed for the purchase of the

truck.

This suit is to determine how much the defendant was

obligated to credit to the plaintiff's account.

As such, it

comes under the above description of an equitable accounting.
This court is not bound by the findings of fact of the
trial court in equity cases.

Rather, it must conduct an

independant evaluation of the evidence in the record.
was stated

This

in First Security Bank of Utah v. Demir is, 10

Utah 2d 405,

354 P. 2d 97 (1960).

It is our prerogative and duty
under the constitution to review the
evidence in equity cases and to modify
or make new findings if the record
compels it.
B.

The Evidence Compels a Reversal of the Trial Court's

~·
i)asis

iR.4G,

The findings of fact made by the trial court had
in the record.

It

found in Finding of Fact #11

32) that the parties had entered a settlement agreement
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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~ich constituted an accord and satisfaction on September

22, 1976, and that such settlement agreement was shown by
Exhibit 7.

An examination of this exhibit gives no

indica-

tion that the parties intended it to settle all of their
claims against each other.
t~ plaintiff conveyed

It is merely a document in which

the ownership of his truck back to

Hr. Davies and Mr. Hiatt in exchange for $1, 526. 03.

The

plaintiff released nothing other than the ownership in his
truck.

In support of this, Mr.

Davies stated (R.185) that

at the time Exhibit 7 was executed, there was no discussion
~tween

the parties regarding any other monies owed to the

plaintiff by the defendant.

As further evidence of the

casual treatment of the testimony and exhibits, the Court
found that the Exhibit had been executed on September 22,
when the evidence demonstrated it had actually been executed

on October 22.

(R.102, Ex.7).

In Court Finding 7,

(R.32) the Court found that neither

of the parties kept a record of the mileage driven by the

plaintiff for the defendant.
~hibit

This is plainly incorrect.

29 shows that the plaintiff did keep mileage records.

The defendant did not keep such records but made an estimate
of mileage in preparation of trial and offered an exhibit
~~d upon a reconstruction of its haulage records.

103, 212-213,

Ex.16).

(R.202-

Further, Court Finding 8, based upon

'.he defendant's reconstructed mileage records found

that

,Jaintiff had driven 105,474 miles for the defendant.

This

'''lLadicts the finding that no mileage records had been
Ppl · ( R. 31)
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In Finding 4, the Court found that the parties had
executed the leases in question.

In Finding 5, it found

that the leases were merely used to meet the Public Service
Commission requirements.

The Court erred as a matter of law

in fa i 1 ing to en force the terms of those agreements.

There

ws no lawful evidence upon which the court could base
Finding 5.

The testimony of the defendant that it did not

intend the leases to be valid was inadmissible as parol
evidence (See discussion in Point I).
Even if defendant's testimony was lawfully admitted,
the court was obligated to find for the plaintiff.

When a

court is confronted with two possible constructions of a
contract, one of them rendering the contract legal and one
of them rendering the contract illegal, it is the duty of
the court to choose the lawful of the two possible construetions.

This was stated by this court in Schofield v. Zions

Co-op. Mercantile Institution, 39 P. 2d 342 (Utah 1934).
A construction giving an instrument
a legal effect to accomplish its purpose
will be adopted when it can reasonably
be done, and between two possible constructions that will be adopted which
establishes a valid contract.
This rule was also followed by the California Supreme
Court in Redke v. Silver Trust, supra.
As a general rule, if a contract can be performed legally, a court will presume that
the parties intended a lawful mode of performance.
The defendant's construction of the leases is that they
~re

a sham and the plaintiff's construction is that they

''' val id and en forcenble.

Under the above rule, the court
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C.

There was not and could not be an accord and satisfac-

tion on October 22, 1976.

Supplementing the arguement made

under B above, there cannot be an accord because there is no
evidence that anyone intended the settlement of October 22,
1976 (Ex.

7) to apply to anything other than the truck.

An

accord is reached only when a clear unambiguous offer of
compromise is accepted by the creditor.

The general view of

the law is stated in 1 AmJur. 2d, Accord and Satisfaction
§14, 312.

To constitute an accord and satisfaction
in law dependent upon the offer of the
payment of money, the offer of money must
be made in full satisfaction of the demand or claim of the creditor and be
accompanied by such acts or declarations
as amount to a cond1t1on that if the
money is accepted, it is to be in full
satisfaction, and it must be of such a
character that the creditor is bound so
to understand the offer.
The debtor is
not required to use any set language in
making his offer of full settlement, as
long as he makes it clear that acceptance
of what he tenders must be in full satisfaction.
(Emphasis added).
In Coover v. G&J Electric, Inc., 285 Or. 247, 590 P.2
720 (1979), the Oregon Supreme Court held that no accord is

reached unless "such intention shall be made known to the
creditor in some unmistakable manner."
There is absolutely no evidence which shows that defendant
clearly offered the $1,586.03 payment in satisfaction of all
claims and that plaintiff understood this and accepted such
offer.

T\s was stated in Part B above, Mr. Davies, the only

witness for the defendant, testified that no other debts
11

,:·11';c;c:d

at the time of the transaction.

( R.185).

I

l
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Further, at the time Exhibit 7 was executed, the plaintiff was making no demand for payments under the lease.
He ente>red the transaction with Hiatt and Davies, not PHD
Trucking, seeking only to sell an apparently unprofitable
truck.

Any money he received was consideration for the

truck only, not for the compromise of any claims against the
defendant.
Finally, the defendant cannot claim accord and satisfaction under Exhibit 7 because it was not a party to that
agreement.

The exhibit shows that plaintiff conveyed his

truck to Verl Davies and Ray Hiatt in their individual
capacities.

PHD Trucking Services Inc. was not mentioned

and there is no indication in the document or other evidence
that Davies and Hiatt were acting as representatives of the
oorporation or that they were treating the corporation as an
alter ego.
Thus, there is no evidence whatsoever of an accord and
satisfaction and this Court is obligated to reverse the
findings of the court below.
POI!JT V
THE PLArnTIFF-APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AGAINST
THE DEFENDAt<T-RESPONDENT IN THE AMOUNT OF $12, 833. 75.
The evidence clearly demonstrates that the defendant is
indebted to the plaintiff in the amount of $12, 833. 75.

The

Plaintiff submitted proposed findings, conclusions and judgment accordinCJly.
Tlw
'"i•'c\yrJ

( R. 33-37)

Frni Lty of the Clefendant's suggested arithmetic is
111

its handling of charges to the plaintiff's
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account.

On

its accounting it charged the plaintiff with

$2,226.66 in diesel repairs that were never made and

explained such peculiar accounting by saying that these
charges were really payroll charges to one of its drivers.
(R.176-178,

138; Ex.

25,

23,

24).

Defendant, when it acted as broker for plaintiff's truck,
also failed to give plaintiff full credit for amounts it
received on plaintiff's behalf for hauling done for another
company, Clark Tank Lines.
$646. 94.

( R.127,

156; Ex.

The amount of this shortage was
25,

29).

The amount of defendant's indebtedness to plaintiff is
calculated in Exhibit 30.

(Line 5 of exhibit 30 is arith-

metically incorrect and should read $12,833.75).

The mileage

figure of 109,409 was calculated in Exhibit 29 which is a
compilation of plaintiff's records from the period he drove
for defendant.

This figure should be taken as correct in

view of the fact that defendant admitted that it kept no
mileage records of its own.

( R. 212-213).

The expense figure

in Exhibit 30 was calculated by the defendant in Exhibit 18.
When the defendant's parol evidence is excluded the
evidence of the defendant's indebtedness according to
plaintiff's calculation is overwhelming.

Since this is

an equity case this Court is empowered to examine the facts
to determine the amount of the indebtedness.

An

examination

of the testimony and exhibits will show that the sum sought
bv plaintiff

is supported by reliable, clear and convincing

'l_,l ·'I I\.._'(';' •
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CONCLUSION
The parties entered into a valid agreement and the
plaintiff is now seeking to enforce that agreement and
require the defendant to account to him for monies due.

The

defendant should be estopped from pleading its fraudulent
scheme in order to avoid its obligations, under considerations of public policy, equity, and the parol evidence rule.
It is requested that this Court reverse the findings of the
trial court and adopt the proposed findings of the plaintiff.
In the alternative the plaintiff asks that this Court declare
the lease agreements to be enforceable and remand the case
for a new trial on the issue of damages.
Respectfully submitted this

~'

~'}---day of October, 1979.

, for:
& PETERSEN

Plaintiff-Appellants
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